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INTRODUCTION.
The American Constitution, which was adopted by
twelve of the original States on the 17th day of Septem-
ber, 1787, contains one of the most perfect plans of
government extant. It was framed at a time when the pulse
of the nation was beating fast and the minds of the people
were filled with the joy caused by the possession of a
blood bought freedom.
The once submissive colonies had become free and
independent States. They had been almost crushed by the
legislative oppresion of aristocratic England and had borne
with conmmendable patience the burdens that had been heaped
upon their sturdy shoulders by the mother country; but at
last the oppression became so grievous and the burdens so
heavy that the colonists, having become exasperated beyond
endurance, turned upon their oppressors and waged a war
with them which lasted several years, and culminated in
the Declaration of Independence which was adorted July 4th
1776, and which proclaimed the political freedom of the
colonies.
The colonists perceiving the truth of the maxim
that * in union there is strength," drew up the Articles
of Confederation, but it soon became apparent that those
Articles were insufficient to preserve harmony between the
States, During the period that the articles were in force
a great many pamphlets were published by statesmen and
publicist pointing out the weak places in them and advo-
cating certain remedies.
Chief among these writers were Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, and James Madison some of whose writings were
published in a paper known as the Federalist. A most
concise and explicit exposition of the purposes and
scope of the Constitution can be found in their writings,
which are collated and arranged in a book bearing the name
of the original paper. These papers having stirred up the
public mind to a realization of the defects in the exist-
ing government, several conventions were held and on the
17th day of September, 1787,the Federal Constitution was
agreed upon. (I)
By the fifth article of the Constitution two meth-
ods of amending the Constitution are recited: one being
where the Congress takes the initiatory step, and the
other where the States propose the amendment. Under the
power conferred by this article fifteen amendments have
been added to the constitution.
The first ten were adopted on December 15th, 1791,
and were added with a view to the prevention of future
controversies as to liberties and rights of the people.
In fact the consent of a number of States to the adoption
of the Constitution was conditioned upon the addition of
these amendments. (2) The eleventh and twelfth amendments
were adopted in 1798 and 1804 respectively. (3)
were
(I) Federalist, 39.
(2) Cooley Const. Law, 206.
(3) Federalist, 47.
C"T'PTER I •
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.
1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servidude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this arti-
clo by appropriate legislation."
There has been a great deal of discussion upon the
question as to whether the Federal Constitution legalized
slavery. It is clear, however, that the Constitution did
recognize the institution, but its framers were careful
about referring to it, and used language that did not
appear flagrantly inconsistent with the theory of the gov-
ernment. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution
slavery existed in all but one of the States, and when the
venomous institution was nurtured and fostered by the laws
then extant. It flourished then, as in later years, most
vigorously in the southern States where th prevailing
occupation was agriculture, whicl of necessity required
many laborers. The New England States were never fully
given up to the practice of human enslavement, yet they
recognized it as a legal institution and permitted it to
exist within their boundaries. (I) The provisions of the
fifth article of the constitution, referred to above,
are that " the Congress, whenever two- thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments
to the constitution or, on the application of the legis-
latures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a
convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case,
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this
constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratifi-
cation may be proposed by the Congresq provided that no
amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand
(1) Cooley Cont. Law 202.
eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the
first and fourth clauses of the ninth section of the first
article, and that no State, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate." (1) Soon
after the adoption of the constitution an article contain-
ing objections to it was circulated. These objections were
formulated by the Hon. George Mason of Virginia, and were
responded to by the Hon. James Iredel, of North Carolina
The tenth objectionwhich relates to the slave trade is as
follows: "The general legislature is restrained from pro-
hibiting the further importation of slaves for twenty odd
years, though such importation renders the United States
weak, more vulnerable, arid less capable of defence.' Mr.
Iredell responded in the following language: " If all the
States had been willing to adopt this regulation, 1 should
as an individual most heartily disapproved of it, because
even if this importation of slaves in fact rendered us
stronger, less vulnerable, and nore capable of defence, I
should rejoice in the prohibition of it, as putting an end
to a trade which has already continued too long for the
(I) U. S. Const. Art. V.
h onor and humanity of those concerned in it • But as it
is well known that South Carolina and Georgia thought a
further continuance of such importations useful to them,
andwould not perhaps otherwise agreed to the new Constitu-
tion; those States which had been importing till satisfied
could not with decencyhave insisted upon their relinquish-
ing advantages they themselves had already enjoyed. Our
situation makes it necessary to bear the evil as it is.
( impor tat ion)
It Will be left to the future legislatures to allow such
or not. If any in violation of their clear convictions
of the injusticeof this trade, persist in pursuing it, that
is a matter between God and their own consciences. The
interests of humanity will, however,have gained something
by the prohibition of this inhuman trade, though at a
distance of twenty years." (1)
The prophecy stated in the last sentence was liter-
ally fulfilled, and from the time of the Revolution the
flowers of freedom, which had blossomed on the battle
field, and which were so dear to the hearts of the patriots
began to send out their liberty laden fragrance to the
dulled senses of an oppressed and subordinated race. The
(1) Pamphlets on Const. 367.
first clause of the ninth section of the first article of
the constitution states, that the immigration or importa-
tion of such persons as any of the States now existing
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Cong-
ress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight
but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation riot
exceeding ten dollars for each person.
It is a noticable fact that great delicacy of ex-
pression is found in the preceding, showing that the fram-
ers handled the subject of slavery with gloved hands. (1)
In 1808 the slave trade was abolished, and its abolition
was prophetic of the subsequent extinction of slavery
itself which occurred December 18th, 1865.
The amendments that have been added to the consti
tution, excluding the eleventh and twelfth, naturally form
two classes: those containing provisions restrictive of
the powers of the general government, and those whose pro-
visions impose limitations upon the States.The first ten
(I) Cooley Const. law, 223;
Pamphlets on Const. (Editors note )
come in the former class and the thirteenth fourteenth
and fifteenth within the latter. (1) The abolitionists
were divided on the question as to whether an amendment
to the Federal Constitution was necessary in order to ren-
der slavery illegal. Those who surporte the affirmative
side of the question claimed that as slavery was legalized
by statute in many of the States , and in those States not
having statutes it was permitted to exist, it was certainly
legal prior to the adoption of the constitution. If, then,
the States possessed the right to legislate in favor of the
existence of slavery, and there was rio provision in the
constitution depriving them of that right, it followed as
a logical sequence that the States still possessed it and
could at any time exercise itunder the amendment which pro-
vides that " the powers not delegated to the United States
by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
That this line of argument presented the correct view of
the case is obvious; and rio better demonstration of its
accuracy could be asked for than that which has been
(I) Cooley Const. Law, 207.
made by subsequent events. The history of the oigin of
this amendment is very lucidly and concisely sta~ed by
Miller, J. in the prevailing opinion of the court in the
Slaughter House Cases. (2) "The institution of African
slavery, as it existed in about half of the States of the
Union, and the contests pervading the public mind for many
years, between those who desired its curtailment and ulti-
mate extinction , and those who desired additional safe-
and
guards for its securit perpetuation, culminated in the ef-
fort, on the part of most of the States in which slavery
existed, to seperate from the Federal government and to re-
sist its authority. This constituted the war of the Rebell
ion, and whatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to
bring about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and
efficient cause was African slavery. In that struggle ,
slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished. It
perished as a necessity of the bitterness and force of the
conflict. When the armies of freedom found themselves
upon the soil of slavery, they could do nothing less than
to free the poor victims whose enforced servidude was th e
(1) 16 Wall. 36.
foundation of the quarrel. Arid when hard pressed these
men ( for they proved themselves men in that terrible
crisis ) offered their services and were accepted by
thousands to aid in suppressing the unlawful Rebellion,
slavery was at an end wherever the Federal government suc-
ceeded in that purpose. The proclamation of President
Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact as to a large por-
tion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared
slavery abolished in them all. But the war being over,
those who had succeeded in re-establishing the authority of
the Federal government were not content to permit this
great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of
the con+est or on the proclamation of the Executive, both
of which might have been questioned in after times, and
they determined to place their main and most valuable
result in the constitution of the restored Union as one of
its fundamental articles. Hence the thirteenth article of
amendment of thatinstrument." The Slaughter House Cases
were first brought to the Supreme Court of the United States
in December, 1870 and were five in number, two of which,
howeverwere compromised;the cases remaining were heard
together. The facts upon which the cases arose are in
substance as follows: a company was incorporated by special
act of the Louisiana legislature and given the exclusive
privilege of erecting buildings and enclosures for the
landing, keeping, inspection and slaughtering of all the
stock to be sold for consumption within an area of 1150 sq.
miles including the city of New Orleans and several contig-
uous parishes. The butchers rose up in indignation and
brought suits to restrain the corporation from exercis-
ing its franchise, claiming that the monopoly that had
been given to the corporation was in violation of the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Counsel for plain-
tiffs rendered elaborate arguments which tended to show
how the meat men were placed in a state of involuntary
servitude, but Miller, J. disposed of this question quite
summarily by saying, that a personal servitude was meant
is proved by the use of the word 'involuntary', which can
only apply to human beings. The exception of servitude
as a punishment for crime gives an idea of the class of
servitude that is meant. The word servitude is of larger
meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly under-
stood in this country, and the olvious purpose was to for-
bid all shades and conditions of African slavery. The
cases were decided in favor of the monopoly, but turned
more particularly upon the construction of the fourteenth
amendment, under which head I shall give them further con-
sideration. The courts have also held that statutes that
provide for compulsory apprenticeship of colored persons
and those compelling such persons to pay large license
fee for following certain lines of work, were void under.
the provisions of the thirteenth amendment • (I)These stat-
were discriminative in character and were for that reason
also in violation of the clause in the fourteenth amerdment
which provides that, " no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
In the matter of Turner (2) the petitioner was held to
service under a statute of the State of Maryland which
provided for the compulsory apprenticeshipof colored per-
sons, and the court held the statute to be unconstitutional
under the thirteenth amendment, as being a species of invol-
untary servitude which came within the prohibition of that
(I) Cooley on Const. Law, 227.
(2) 1 Abbots Rep. ( N. S. ) 84.
amendment. The term 'servitude' as used in this amendment,
is a broader term than 'slavery' and under it Mexican peon-
age and the Chinese coolie system could not exist in this
country . (I) It was held in the Civil Rights Cases (2)
that the appropriate legislation"which by the second clause
of the thirteenth amendment Congress is empowered to
enact, must not be direct , but must be corrective of State
action which may have been taken in violation of the terms
of this section. In these cases(3)which were decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States in 1886, it was
held that the "denial of equal accommodations in inns,
public conveyances and places of public amusement (which
was forbidden by the first and second sections of the Civil
Rights Act of March 1st, 1875)imposes no badge of slavery
or involuntary servitude upon the party, but at most
infringes rights which are protected from State agression
by the fourteenth amendment." In these cases there was an
able dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan in which he
said:- "They (the court) admit, as I have said, that the
thirteenth amendment established freedom, that there are
(I) Slaughter House Cases, supra.
(2) 109 U. S. 3.
(3) 109 U. S. 3.
burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of
slavery which constitute its substance and visibie form;
that Congress by the act 6f 1866, passed in viuw of the
Thirteenth Amendment, before the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, undertook to remove certain burdens and disabilio
ties, the necessary incidents of slavery, and to secure
to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard
to previous servitude,those fundamental rights which are
the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to
make and enforce contracts, to sul be parties, give evidence
and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property
as is enjoyed by white citizens; that under Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress had to do with slavery and its inci-
dents, and that legislation , so far as necessary or prop-
er to eradicate all forms and incidents.of slavery and in-
voluntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating
upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State
legislation or not. These propositions being conceeded it-
is impossible, as it seems to me, to question the consti-
tutionality of the Civil Rights Act of i-66.' The act
referred to was passed April 9th, 186( and was based upon
the authority conferred upon Congress by the second section
of the amendment under consideration. Congress has plen-
ary power under this amendment to legislate with regard to
slavery and involuntary servitude'and does not have to wait
until the States have passed laws violating the terms of th
the amendment.
Such legislation by Congress must be clearly within
the purview of the amendment. This is not so with regard
to the Fourteenth Amendmentor the Fifteenth, in each of
which there is a denial of State power, and in the latter,of
federal power also.
CHAPTER 11.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
SECTION I.
Citizenship
"All persons born or naturalized in the United State
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
The sentence just quoted is the one with which the
Fourteenth amendment begins. It performed a mighty funct-
ion the scope of which, though too vast for accurate con-
ceptioi is well defined.By it four millions of people were
clothed in the habiliments of civil liberty;by it the moun-
tains of race prejudice were shaken and partially destroyed
as though a great earthquakehad visited them, and by it
provisions in a number of State cnstitutions were depriv-
ed of their vitality and became void and of no effect.
That two kinds of citizenship are recognizedby this
provision, there can be no doubt° (I)In delivering the opinr-
(1) Slaughter House Cases, supra.
ion of the court in these cases, Miller J.said: when con-
sidering this clause, "The distinction between citizenship
of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly
recognized arid established. Not only may a man be a citi-
zen of the United States without being a citizen of a State
but an important element is necessary to convert the
former into the latter. He must reside within the State to
make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that
he should be born or naturalized in the United States to
make him a citizen of the UniorV" The decision in Scott v.
Sandford(I)had been to the effect that slaves or their
descendants were not "the people of the United States" or
any part of them and therefore could not be citizens. This
case has been the cause of a great deal of disapproval
and at the time it was rendered ( '157) the Supreme Court
was censured severely for handing down such a decision.
The departments of government disregarded it and per-
mitted colored persons to sue in the United States courts
the same as citizens(2) This was the right which was
(I) 19 How. 393.
(2) Cooley Const. Law, 252-3.
denied to them by this case. The court also went to an un-
warranted extent in the opinion and denied the right of the
United States to prohibit slavery in the territories. For
this it was justly censured and the court was arraigned
um
by the press in the formAof public opinion, and the ver-
dict that was rendered was against the court. The decree
of justice, however, required thousands of men foi its
execution which was forcibly resisted. The records of that
verdict has become part and parcel of the grandest plan
of government extant, and is familiarly known as the Four -
teentl Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The facts of
Scott v. Sanford, otherwise known as the "Dred Scott Decis-
ion', are as follows:- The plaintiff and his wife, Harriet,
were in the year 1836, the property of one Dr. Emerson at
Fort Snelling in Upper Louisiana arid were married in that
year with the consent of the latter. Two children, Eliza-
and Lizzie, were the fruits of their union. In 1838 Dr.
Emerson took the family into Missouri. Prior to this, in
1834, Dred Scott,the plaintiff, had been taken from Mis*.
souri to Rock Island in Illinois, and fron there to Fort
Snelling. The plaintiff instituted an action for his free-
dom which was decided in his favor by the Circuit Court
but the judgement below was reversed by the Supreme Court
on a writ of error • The case was sent back to the Circuit
Court where it remained pending until this case was decided
as the ruling of the Federal Supreme Court would have
great weight with the State courts, it being the court
of last resort. The defendant Sanford purchased the plain-
tiff and his family from Dr. Emerson before this suit was
begun. The case had two hearings before the Supreme Court
and the first part of the preva iling opinion, which was
written by Chief Justice Tarey is taken up with questions
of pleading, but the latter and greater part is devoted
to a discussion of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Cburt
of the United States.
The plaintiff contended that he was a citizen of
the United States, but the court said that as he was the
descendant of persons bought from Africa and sold into
slavery here, he could not be such a ci tizen and consequen
ly the CircuitCourt had exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
charge of the case.
Indians who re-,ain their allegianic'e to their tribes
and are under the control of their hative chiefs are riot
citizens of the United States although born in this count-
ry. (I)However it seems that if they become tax payers
they are citizens; still it has been held that they must be
naturalized before they reach that exalted state. (2) In
Jackson v. Goodell, supra land was purchased from the heir
of an Onieda Indian to whom it had been grantedas a recom-
pense for services in the tevolutionary War. The deed of
the Indian was attacked on the ground that he was not a
citizen, and the court held that "Indians within this State
(New York) are riot citizens , but are distinct tribes or
nations, living under the protection of the government.
No white person can lawfully purchase ary right or title to
landfrom any 1neiari or Indians without the authority
and consent of the leg islatu.-e (3) The statutes just
cited (note 3) permit all citizens of the United States to
take, hold) and convey land, but restrict all land contracts
with Indians to such as are made with the express sanction
of the legislature, thus showing very clearly h'Iat the
legislature in passing those laws did riot consider the In-
& -
(1) Cooley Const. Law, 254;
Jackson v. Goodell, 20 John., 693.
(2) 112 U. S. 94. (3) 1 N. Y. R. S. 719, 720.
dian to be a citizen • There are numerous decisions hold-
ing this way and the States are so uniform in regard to thi
this point that a citation of more authorities would be
superfluous.
By the eighthsection of the first a 'ticle of the
constitution power is given to Congress t(, .stablish a
uniform rule of naturalization in order that there might be
no such conflict of laws as would issue from permitting
the States to have control of this important matter. The
American nation may well be styled the offspring of the
Old World, for she consists of people of every conceivable
nationality • Thereis scarcely a race or nation which
has not contributed some portion of the people now inhab-
iting t he United States. One nation in particular had con
tributed so largely our population that legislation was
enacted for the purpose of restraining the tide of imigra-
tion which incessantly flows into this country. 1 refer to
the Chinese. The act of May 6th, 1882 prohibited, the imm4i
gration of Chinese laborers for ten years, and by the four
teenth eection of this act which is chapter 126, Laws of
1882 it is provided that " no State court or court of the
United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship." This
act expired May 6th 1892 and was reenacteu May 5th,1892.
An enactment of this nature is confessedly opposed
to our theory of naturalization and is contrary to the spi'
it of our institutions, but the law is based upon expedien-
cy and necessity . The preamble states the law is enacted
because " in tte opinion of the government of the United
States the coming od Chinese laborers to this country endan-
gers the good order of certain localities within the ter-
ritory thereof ." The localities referred to are the
western States in several of which serious disturbances
have taken place because of the employment of "cooltes"irl
the mines. Officers of the Chinese government, their
servants and such Chinamen as were in the United States at
the time of the passage of the act or ninety days there-
afterare excepted from its most rigorous provisions and
may come and go subject to certain regulationsas to regis-
tering.
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunrities of the citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; ri
nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws."
Thus reads the second and last sentence of the section
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
An immense amount of litigation has been carried on
in which the various clauses of this sentence have been
construed , and 1 believe it can be safely said without
fear of successful contradiction that a greater number of
cases have arisen involving the construction of the various
parts of this momentus sentence than have come up under
any other single amendments.. For convenience and lucidity
it is advisable to consider this part of our subject under
sub-titles, and the more so because it naturally divides
itself into these parts.These are (I) Privileges and immun-
ities; (2) Due Process of paw; (3) The Equal Protection of
the Law. These will be treated of in the order in which
they are stated.
Citizenship carries with it many rights and priv-
leges. Thus if one is a citizen of a State he can sue in
the United States Courts in such cases as these courts
can take cognizanceo (1)Citizenship, however,does not
always confer upon its possessor the right of suffrage;
(1) Scott v. Sanford, supra.
this is obvious, for infants, idiots, arid females may be
citizens, but theyare not permitted to exercise the electil
franchise. (I) SECTION 11.
Privileges arid immunities.
The words 'privileges and immunities' are also to be
.ound in the body of the Constitution in the second sect-
ion of the fourth article which reads as follows:- "The ci
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the priv-
ileges arid immunities of the citizens in the several States
The privileges and immunities referred to by this section
are those vhich belongs to persons in consequence of their
being citizens of a State. They have been held to be such
as are "Fundamental and which belong of ri htto citizens
of all free goverrment."(2) The privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States are general in their
nature, and various persons have saught to enumerate them,
but as arbitrary rules are likely to do gz'eat injustie_
the question as to whethe, " thc right claimed by a person
is one which comes within this category should be decided
according to the facts in each case and riot according to
'I( Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.
(2) Ci.field -,. Coryell 4 Wash. Circuit Court 371
inflextble jud'-e made laws. (I) Women are citizens and as
such a -e entitled to the privileges and immunities of the
same, but the right to vote is not necessarily included in
the privileges and immunities of citizenship. In Minor v.
Hoppersett, cited above, (2)the court after proving that
women were citizens but riot voters prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment, said:- "The amendment did riot add to the priv-
ileges and immunities of a citizen. It simply furnished
an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he
already had. No new voters were necessarily made by it.
Indirectly it may have had that effect, because it may have
increases the number of citizens entitled to suffrage under
the conditions and laws of the States, but it operates for
this purpose if at all, through the States and the State
laws and not directly upon the citizen. This case arose
in Missouri, Mrs. Virginia Minor a citizen of that State
brought suit against the defendent, an election official
for failing to insert her name in the list of registered
voterq,she having given it to him for registration. It was
held as indicated above that she could not recover. The
(1) Cooley Const. Law, 195.
(2) See page 25.
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constitutions UAall the States exclude women from the exer
cise of the elective franchise. in some States they are
permitted to vote at school elections and in four they may
hold offices that pertain entirely to the managemnet of
schools. (I) The right to sell liquor is riot a privilege-
or,-immunity of a citizen of the United States which is
protected from State interference by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. (2) The amendment under consideration does not de-
prive the States of their right to restrain the practice
of certain occupations in order that the public health and
general welfare may be prcmnoted, even though the State in
so 6oing practically give a monopoly of such occupation
to a limited number of persons. In other words The amend-
ment does not divest the States of their right to reason-
ably exercise the police power. The privilege of engaging
in the practice of arts, trades or professions is one which
attaches to a person by reason of State and not of Federal
citizenship, and therefore, is riot protected by the amend-
ment under discussion.(3) In Bradwell v. State, the plain-
tiff, a woman, attempted to secure a license to practice
(I) Stimpson's American Statute Lay, 23,24.
(2) Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 129.
(31 Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall., 130.
law in the State of Illinois, claiming to be -ntitled to
such license under the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradley, J.
said in his concurring opinion:- "It is the perogative of
the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature,
reason and experience for the due admission of qualified
persons to professions and callings demanding special Skill
and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of
the State, and in my opinion, in view of the peculiar char-
acteristics, destiny and mission of womani, it is within
the province of the legislature to ordain what offices,
positions arid callings shall be filled and discharged by
men,and shall receive the benefit of those energies and
responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are
presumed to predominate in the sterner sex."
Trial by jury in State courts has been held to be
a privilege of State and not national Citizenship. (1)
The right of persons of African descent to be chosen
as jurors was vindicated in Ex parte Virginia. (2) A judge
was indicted for failing to include in his list of grand
and petit jurors certain qualified colored citizens. The
(I) Walker v. Sauvinet, 20 Otto, 90.
(2) 100 U. S. 339.
court held that being a State officer his act was that of
the State and cane within the prohibition of the amendment
A State may confer certain rights upon specified
conditions, arid such rights can not be claimed by citizens
of other States, because those rights are local in their
operation. Under the peculiar circumstances of that case
the court in Conner v. Elliot (1) held that the discrim-
ination was between coctracts and riot persons. By statute
of Louisiana, women who married within theState were given
a comtnunity of interest in the gains or acque~s of their
husbands. The plaintiff married and resided with her hus-
band in Mississippi; her husband acquired property in
Louisiana subsequent to the marriage. Plaintiff claimed a
right to community under the statute but the court denied
the right.
The amendment is prohibitory in form but has been
held to confer a positive immunity. (2) The courts, as
is evident from the foregoing discussion, have given the
term privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States a liberal construction, and the manifest intention
(1) 18 How., 91.
(2) Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 603.
of the framers of the amendment has been sought for, and,
to a great extent, carried out. A further discussion of
the cases arising under this sub-title would undoubtedly
be profitable, but time and space will not permit it.
SECTION 1l1.
Due Process of Law.
The term 'due process of law' has long been used
by judges, legislators and text-book writers. It has
been held to be synonymous in meaning vith the expression
'the law of the land'. (1) 'Due process of law' has been
said to be 'due law: -By this is meant that the operation
of a rule of law must be such that it inflicts no greater
hardship upon the party or parties against whom it operates
than the constitution permits, and the rights of all with
respect to it should be uniform. What is and what is not
'due process of law'is often a very perplexing question
and the courts have wrestled with it long and arduously.
There have been cases innumerable in which it has
arisen, and conflicting decisions have been rendered in
(1) Cooley Const. Law, 230.
the courts of last resort in the various States on the
same state of facts. it was held in New York that a law
which substantially destroys the property in intoxicating
liquors owned and possessed by persons within the State
a
when the act took effect was violation of the provisions
in the constitution of that State which ordered that no
person should be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. And a statute which caused
a party charged with a crime to be tried before a court
of special session, contravened the clause of the con-
stitution guaranteeing the right of trial by jury, and
was, therefore, void. (1) In the foregoing case the
plaintiff was permitted to recover compensation for his
loss of property. The contrary was held in the case
of Mugler v Kansas. (2) There the court held that such
a provision did not deprive a person of property within
the maaning of the constitution (U. S.) as the party
still retained the legal title and possession of his
property. This decision is subject to criticism because
(T Wynehamer v.. The People 13 N. Y. 378.
(2) 123 U. S. 623.
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it fails to recognize the fact that a deprivation of the
right to use property, thereby causing its value to
materially depreciate, is a taking of property which is
in contravention of the spirit if not the letter of the
provision of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution. The fifth amednment to the constitution
of the United States contains a provision similar in
form to the one under discussion, but that anendment has
been held to apply to federal legislation only and not
to the States. (1) In Davidson v. New Orleans, (2)
the court in speaking of "due process of law" said : "It
must be confessed, however, that the constitutional
meaning or value of the phrase "due process of law" re-
mains to-day without that satisfactory precision of
definition which judicial decisions have given to nearly
all the other guarantees of personal rights found in the
constitutions of the several states and of the United
States." The court further stated that "due process"
did not necessarily imply a regular proceeding in
courts, but also applies to ministerial proceedings.
(1) King v. Wilson 1 Dill. 555.
(2) 96 U. S. 97.
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The rights of individuals to life, liberty, and property
is fundamental and it is the essential purpose of a
government to secure these to its members. Blackstone
calls them absolute rights and says they are "that resid-
ium of natural liberty which is not required by the laws
of society to be sacrificed to public convenience ." (1)
The following extract is from the speech of Daniel Web-
ster in the Dartmouth College Case (2) and has been
frequently quoted by judges and law writers : "By the
law of the land is most clearly intended the general law
which hears before it condemns ; which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The
meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty and property, under the general rules which
govern society. "Life", says the learned Mr. Black-
stone, "is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent
by nature in every individual". For a concise defi-
nition of liberty, that laid down by Earl, J., in the
matter of Jacobs (3) is by far the best, the judge said :
(1) Blackstone, Chase's 2d Ed., 68.
(2) 4 Wheat,. 529.
(3) 98 N. Y. 98.
"Liberty, in it- broad sense as understood in this
country, means the right, not only of freedom from
actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the
right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to
live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in
any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or
avocation." In this case it was held that a statute
forbidding the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses
was in conflict with both State and Federal constitutions
as it was a deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. A law which discriminates between different kinds
of business in invalid for the same reason. (1) It was
held in Rockwell v. Nearing (2) that a stature permit-
ting the confiscation of trespassing cattle is void as
not being due process of law. In California a con-
viction was pronounced invalid because there had been
no indictment by a grand jury. Where a statute gives
a right of appeal, after the usual time has expired, and
the decree of the lower court has been executed, it is
unconstitutional as it would retrospectively deprive a
(1) People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377.
(2) 35 N. Y. 302.
a party of a vested legal right. Stated in dictum in
Burch v. Newbury. (1) A citizen cannot have his taxes
reduced on the ground that he is being deprived of
property without due process of law, simply because he
does not receive as much benefit from improvements as
others. (2) The court said that in cases of taxation
there might be hardship in particular instances, but
the parties upon whom the hardship fell would have to
stand it, as the law operated more beneficially than
detrimentally to the general public. Taxes may be col-
lected otherwise than by suit and not be a deprivation
of property without due process if the tax payer is given
a chance to protest before a board of tax commissioners,
for due process does not mean a judicial proceeding. (3)
Trial without a jury is "due process of law", otherwise
our equity courts would be illegal. But a State law
providing that suits in equity shall be tried without a
jury is not in conflict with the provisions of the con-
stitution or its amendments. (4) Where a statute
-- ---------------------------------
(1) 10 N. Y. 374.
(2) Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 14 Otto 78.
(3) McMillen v. Anderson 5 Otto 37.
(4) Walker v. -a vinet, 92 U. S. 90.
provided that in election contests the title to an of-
fice might be tried and determined in one day, and only
allowed two days in which appeals could be taken, it
was held to be constitutional as due process did not
imply delay. (1) This case, like the one preceding
it contained statements to the effect that a jury may be
omitted without impairing the legality of the proceedinga
The seizure of property for taxes after due notice to
the owner is due process of law. (2) The courts have
declared that the word "property" includes not only
tangible property, but the right to use such property
and the right to enforce choses in action. (3) From
this brief review of the cases it is evident that for a
proceeding to be "due process of law" it is indispen-
sible that it conform to all the requirements of the
constitution and statutes of the individual state in
which it is instituted and of the United States,
The question, as to whether a proceeding is or is
not "due process of law" can be readily answered by a
(1) Kennard v. Louisiana 93 U. S. 480.
(2) McMillen v. Anderson, supra.
(3) Wynehamer v. People, supra. Burch v. Newbury,supra.
reference to the legislative records of the State and
Nation ; and if the proceeding violates the provisions
therein contained, that is to say, it deprives a person
or persons of one or more of the three fundamental
rights of a citizen, to wit : the right of "personal
security", the right of "personal liberty", and the
right of "private property", it is not "due process of
law" and is consequently, unconstitutional and void.
As I have previously intimated the expressions "due pro-
cess of law" and "the law of the land" have been held
to be synonymous, (1) and judges and law writers now
use the terms interchangeably.
If a person is committed to jail by a Justice of
the Peace for a crime committed outside of the county,
such person is deprived of his liberty without "due
process of law! (2) The reason for this is obvious as the
Justice in such a case has no jurisdiction.
Where a judge charged the jury as to the first but
not the second degree of murder and no exception was
(1) Cooley's Const. law, 230, Civil Rights Cases, 109
U. S. 3. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, supra.
(2) In re Kelly 46 Fed. 653.
taken to the charge at the time, the refusal of the
upper court to which the case was appealed, to listen to
arguments based on the insufficiency of the charge, is
not a denial of Udue process of law" or (1) of the equal
protection of the laws.
A statute compelling the Chinese to move from the
City of San Francisco outside of its limits is void,
such statute being unequal in its operation and permit-
ting the confiscation of property without "due process'(2)
Taking property because of a failure to pay an
assesment of water rates, without notice to the owner,
is a taking of property without "due process of law! (3)
When an action is begun against a non-resident by
service of summons by publication or by personal service
without the State, the judgment in such action is bind-
ing upon defendant's property in the State, and the
defendant is not deprived of his property without due
process. Otherwise a State could not get jurisdiction
of a non-resident's property within its limits. (4)
(1) So held in avis v. State 13 S. W. 994.
(2) In re Sing 2oo Quan, In re Lee Sing 46 Fed. 259.
(3) Dasey v. Skizaer 11 N. Y. sup. 821.
(4) Hogle v. Mott 20 Ab. 276.
Prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
a person could not raise the question as to whether a
proceeding under the laws of a State, was or was not "due
process of law" unless the constitution or statutes of
such State gave him the right to do so. The idea of "due
process of law" first found legal expression in the in-
strument in which its synonym originally appeared, namely,
the memorable fountainof English and American liberty,
Magna Charta. Wrested as it was from King John, by the
feudal barons at the point of the sword at Runnymede,
England, on June 15, 1215, the English speaking people
have loved and cherished not for the rights it granted,
but also because it was a legislative enactment secured
by the people acting in a sovereign capacity.
Men may reasonably differ at times upon the problem
as to whether a certainproceeding is or is not "due pro-
cess of law", hence it is necessary that there should be
some guide to direct the legal mind into the proper chan-
nel of reasoning in order that a correct solution of the
problem may be obtained. Such a guide I believe can be
found in the rule statedon page (36). An accurate deter-
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mination of the question is essential to the proper ad-
ministration of justice, and it is to be hoped that the
bench will always be filled with men whose acumen and
perspicacity will enable them to pass safely through the
wilderness of cases and secure the most appropriate rule,
and whose senseof justice will be so keen that they will
not be led by subordinate issues into a misapplication
of that rule.
SECTIO;J V.
The Equal Protection of the Law.
"No State shall x x x deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The
prohibition contained in the sentences just quoted is
eminently just. That the inhabitants of a State, however
diversified their races, color, or previous conditions
may be, shall be divided into classes, some of which are
especially favored by the laws and the others are dis-
criminated against by them is obviously unfair, unjust,
and unequitable. Such, however, has been the case and
the halls of justice have been thronged with litigants,
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whose rights have been invaded by the State. Innumerable
decisions have been rendered and a review of some of
them would, perhaps, not be unprofitable. States not in-
frequently pass laws which are discriminations, in fact,
but have been held not to be so in law, on the theory
that if equal prohibitions are imposed on different class-
es, those classes receive the protection of the laws.
It is on this ground that laws requiring colored and
white children to attend separate schools.
There are a number of arguments which may be ad-
vanced in favor of such laws, but sophistries and subtil-
ity of reasoning can not impart justice into a discrimina
tive enactment. In Ex Parte Francois, the court held
that a law which punished a white person for marrying a
colored person was valid because it did not discriminate
between persons on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. The court did not discuss the
matter very fully, but said that the reason it considered
the law just was, because such marriages are usually the
(1) 3 Woods 367.
result of the influence of the former over the latter.
The conclusion arrived at was not justified by the reason
ing of the court as it is evident the law discriminates
between persons on account of race, color, and previous
condition. All the citizens of a State are entitled to
the right to serve on juries of their district, or to be
more accurate,; all the male citizens of whatever race,
or color, should have their names placed upon the jury
lists of their district in accordance with the laws ap-
plicable thereto, and the acts of the officers having
charge of the compilation of such lists in excluding the
names of persons by law entitled to be included in such
lists, have been held to be the action of the State un-
der whose laws they hold office.(1) A colored man, so it
has been decided, is not denied the equal protection of
the laws, because he is not allowed a mixed jury. (2)
Colored men have a right to be permitted to give
evidence in suits or prosecutions at law. However, the
Act of April 9, 1866, did not confer jurisdiction upon
the United States courts in a case in which the only fact
(1) Strauder v West Virginia, supra.
(2) Virginia v Rives.
relied on to bring the case within the jurisdiction of
the courts is that the material witnesses are negroes.(l)
The question has been frequently raised as to who are
"persons." It has almost invariably come up with re-
gard to corporations which have gone from the State in
which they were incorporated to another with the inten-
tion of carrying on their line of business.
It has been held that a State may exclude foreign
corporations from doing business within its limits on the
ground that a corporation being the child of the law, it
is limited to the territory over which that law operates
and States are not bound to give effect to the laws of
other States. Corporations are citizens of the State
in which they are incorporated, but cannot claim the
protection of the second section of the 4th article of
the Constitution. (2) It has also been decided that a
corporation is a person within the section of the
Fourteenth Ameadment under consideration. (3) The courts
are becoming more and more liberal in dealin' with cor-
porations, and they will ere long entirely relinquish
(1) Blye~v. U. S. 13 Wall. 580.
(2) Paul i. Virginia, 6 Wall. 168.
(3)Phila. Fire Ass'n v. N. Y. 119 U. S. 110.
the fiction of the indivisibility , and intangibility of
the corporation and show more regard to the persons who
actually compose it • There are barriers whica oppose
the progress of the courts when they resort to such
reasoning; but time will evolve a plan by which those obw
struction may be removed or surmounted and the wheels of
justice will revolve with much less friction than they do
at present.
In several of the southern States laws, providing
for the transportation of colored and white passengers in
eperate cars, have been passed. These laws like those
providing for s eperate schools, are justified upon the
ground that the law operates as harshly on one class as
on the 6the r . That these laws are the offsprirg of prej-
udice there can be no doubt , and having such a suspicious
origin , it is not surprising that they should possess
certain undesirable characteristics.
Such statutes have a tendency to preserve rather
than to destroy race distinctions. By the expressed views
of the founders of our government and the statements of
our most profound thinkers, the equality of the component
parts of the nation is the basis of our government.
This principle became part of the organic law. These iaws
conflict with this principle and their abrogationis simply
a matter of time.
The second section of this Amendment provides for th
apportionment of representatives and changes it from the
"whole number o f free persons including those bound to ser-
vice for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed"
plus "three fifth of all other persons", to the "whole num-
ber of persons in each State? exwluding indians not taxed."
This section also provides that the representation
shall be proportionately reduced when properly qualified
"male inhabitants"are denied the right to votes
Section third provides that "no person shall be
senator or representative in Congress, or elector of Presi-
dent and vice president, or hold ar office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken ar oath, as a member of ConE.
ress or as an officer of the United States, or as a member
of any State legislature, or as an executive or judivial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebel-
lion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of eac h house, remove such disability. "
The fourth section affirris "the validity of the pub-
lic debt of the United States 0 and repudiates "any debt
or obiigation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
again t the same. By the fifth section Congress is given
the power to enforce the provisions of the Amendment by
appropriate legislation . This Amendment was adopted in
1868 and placed the recently enslavec, race upon an equal
plane with other races.
CHAPTER IlI.
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Section I. The rights of citizens of the United
States to vote shall riot be denied or abridged by the
United States, or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.
Section 11. The Congress shall have power to en-
force this by appropriate legislation.
The right of suffrage is by nearly all of the States
constitutions confined to males over twenty one years of
age, and by seven of them to white male inhabitants. (I)
In Idaho a "Test Oath Statute" was held valid. This statue
made it necessary for voters to take an oath as a qualifi-
cation for voting. (2) Where State, laws provide for
registration in order to cast a legal vote, they do riot
conflict with the Fifteenth Amendunent. (3) in Washington,
(1) Stimsons Am. Stat. Law, 22, 23, 240.
(2) Innis v. Bolton, 17 Pac. 264;
Hayward v. Bolton, id. 457.
(3) Parsons v. Comrs. City Buffalo, 37 N. W. 756.
Wyoming and Utah women are permitted to vote. (1)
Temorary absence from the State does not deprive a citizen
of his residence there for the purpose of voting.
This Amendment has been held to confer upon col-
ored men the privilege and duty of sitting upon juries. (2)
But it does riot secure to persons the equal protection
of the laws. (3)
This Amendment gave to a once enslaved race the
power of exercising the elective franchise. The hands which
had touched nothing but the- shovel and the hoe were now
permitted to deposit legal votes in the ballot box. The
minds which had been fetered with ignorance for centu-
ries were freed from their bonds; those who had so long
been doubly governed were at last allowed to share in the
government. Those who had never grasped any situation but
that of servility now rose to a higher planeof action amd
were clad in the habiliments of free citizenship. The new
citizens rushed with greatagility into the political arena
and their actions were very distasteful to their former
owners.
(I) Stimsons Am. Stat. Law, 240.
(2) Neal v. Delaware 105 U. S. 370.
(3) U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629.
A reaction soon set in, however, and the protegees of the
Union settled down to s.ober and industrious lives.
Gradually adjusting themselves to the situation, the
former slaves, who had demonstrated their bravery on the
battle field, soon proved their ability to exercise the
franchise in an honorable manner.
There had been clauses in the constitutions of a num
ber of the States which conferred the right to vote to
"white male inhabitants*; these provisions were of course
annulled by this amendment, as were all statutory provis-
ions having a similar import. The wisdom of this provis-
ion has been frequantly questioned, but there is no doubt
that time will conclusively settle beyond all controversy
that the riation in enacting this amendment performed one
act that will redound to its undying credit. States are
the objects of this prohibition; together with the United S
States. The actions of individuals are unprovided for
as it was assumed that the injured party could seek redress
for the actions of the latter in the State courts.
The colored men of the southern States are hindered,
delayed and prevented from voting at the elections year
after year and the federal government is powerless to aid
them. Laws aimed at this crying evil have been proposed
and rejected; individual influence has been exerted by
various e sons but all to no avail Be it remembered,
however, that ere another century has rolled into eternity
there will be a turn in the tide of affairs arid, as 1 inti-
mated in a preceding paragraph, the wisdom of the nation
in enac, ting the Fifteenth Amendment will be universally
recognized and admitted.
Mob rule will have been abolished, Ku Klux Klans
will be unheard of, Rifle Clubs will not exist, arid the
ballot will be accessable to all qualified citizens of
the United States. This result will be brought about by
education; the class to which the ballot was extended
appreciate
on March 30th, 1870, will thoroughly.its intrinsic worth,
and side by side with their fellow citizens will securely
dwell beneath the protecting folds of the ever glorious
stars and stripes, which 1 hope will forever wave over the
"LAND OF THE FREE AND THE HOME OF THE BRAVE."
